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thE chicago tEachErS StrikE and itS Public
Amy B. Shuffelton 
introduction 
“Chicago is the place to make you recognize at every turn the absolute opportu-
nity which chaos affords—it is sheer Matter with no standards at all,” John Dewey 
wrote to his wife Alice on an early visit there.1 Such a city, which had become the 
geographical nexus of American industrial democracy, pushed Dewey to consider 
the problems industrial modes of organization pose for democratic theory. His re-
conceptualization of democracy, and the refinements and clarifications to it that he 
made over the years, reflects an appreciation of the significance of work—of human 
transfiguration of chaotic matter into something useable, and of the corollary con-
struction of human psychology as it meets with the world around it and resolves 
the problems it thereby encounters. 
By the 1920s, democratic realists contemplating the landscape of American 
political life in the wake of several more decades of industrialization, technological 
advances, and human mobility wondered if a democratic public were even possible. 
One hope was that, using Dewey’s terms above, “matter” might have some “stan-
dards” after all; the application of science and social science to the problems of the 
day might yield knowledge that could be employed in political decision-making.2 
Of these realists, Walter Lippmann was recognized by Dewey as particularly in-
sightful. As Dewey noted, Lippmann provided “a more significant statement of the 
problem of knowledge than professional epistemological philosophers have been 
able to give.”3 Lippmann’s book began with an epigraph from Plato’s Republic, and, 
like Plato, Lippmann suggests that secure knowledge is the foundation of a good 
polity, with the illusions provided by the workaday world standing as a serious 
threat to its stability. Taking up the challenges that Lippmann’s argument poses, 
Dewey’s The Public and Its Problems provides a different account of the knowledge 
that should guide democratic politics, a modern account of practical judgment in 
lieu of technical reason.4
A century later, the terms of work have changed again, and the problems 
Dewey and Lippmann considered are freshly relevant. This paper considers the 
2012 Chicago Teachers Strike as an instance in which a public, in Dewey’s sense, 
briefly emerged in response to perceived problems that raise precisely the set of ques-
tions regarding knowledge and democratic governance that Dewey and Lippmann 
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addressed. The direct impetus for the strike was Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel’s 
decision to lengthen the school day and year without a proportional rise in teacher 
pay, but the strike tapped deeper concerns. Parents and teachers supported the 
strike in large part because they perceived “expert” advisors and the politicians they 
advised to be changing schools in ways that ran counter to parents’ and teachers’ 
own senses of what their children needed. For the past twenty years, Chicago has 
been a bellwether of the education reform movement, which has removed control 
of public schools from the hands of citizens and professional educators and placed 
it in the hands of expert manipulators of symbols. Like would-be philosopher kings, 
the businesspeople who sit on Chicago’s Board of Education and the politicians 
who put them there speak of schools in terms of a quasi-mathematical knowledge 
of educational problems and their solutions. The parents and teachers of Chicago’s 
children instead place their confidence in their ongoing experiences with the chil-
dren they live with. Policy-makers and pundits tell us that parents and educators 
are misguided; that faith in experience-based knowledge of children and schools 
renders us dumb and immobile, chained to outdated conventions, determined to 
raise our children on myths because we cannot face the light of truth.5 To the re-
formers’ argument, Dewey’s The Public and Its Problems provides a refutation that 
is as powerful now as it was a century ago. 
thE chicago tEachErS StrikE
In September 2012, the Chicago Teachers Union (CTU) went on strike. The strike 
was ostensibly prompted by a disagreement about the terms of a new contract, but 
interpreters recognized that this was no simple labor dispute.6 Commentators iden-
tified two major themes underlying the conflict: labor politics and the education 
reform movement. Given the local and historical context, both explanatory frames 
seem apt. In recent months, initiatives to change collective bargaining laws had 
swept through Midwestern states, most dramatically in Wisconsin, where citizens 
joined unionized workers to protest for weeks around the Capitol building, but also 
in Indiana and Ohio. Although Illinois seemed unlikely to pass laws as restrictive 
as its neighbors, it was a good moment for a union to flex its muscles. Truck drivers, 
firefighters, and other unionized workers honked their support for teachers as they 
drove by the picket lines, and their solidarity seemed an invocation of longstanding 
labor movement ideals. Importantly, though, teachers are professionals as well as 
union members, and teachers’ rhetoric around the strike suggests that they were 
motivated by the dissonance between their interpretation of what it means to teach 
children and the notion of teaching implied by reformers. In videos that groups of 
teachers posted on YouTube, they performed a rewrite of the popular song “Call Me, 
Maybe.” “Our hearts are with our kids/Teachers just have one wish/To get back to 
our kids/The board is in our way,” they sang, showing more enthusiasm for teach-
ing—though on their own terms—than for political battles.7
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The board that was, as they saw it, “in [their] way” has not been democratically 
elected since 1995, when Chicago’s public schools were placed under mayoral control. 
Chicago has been an epicenter of reform initiatives for several decades now, includ-
ing the early roll-out of standardized testing, school closures and turnarounds, and 
the mass replacement of public schools with charters. These initiatives consistently 
disempower professional educators, as well as parents and other citizens. The strike 
expressed broad dissatisfaction with reform policies that teachers interpreted as a 
threat to their work as teachers and parents interpreted as a threat to their author-
ity over their children’s education. A majority of citizens, and two-thirds of parents 
with children in Chicago Public Schools, supported the CTU.8 In response to CTU 
rhetoric that stretched beyond the simple matter of wage negotiations, Chicago’s 
mayor Rahm Emanuel filed an injunction against the union, claiming that the strike 
was illegitimate because it was about “non-economic issues.”9 As it happened, CTU 
delegates ended the strike before the matter came to court, so that legal question 
was never settled. Whether it meets the law’s definition of “economic issues” or not, 
though, the strike expressed a deep concern about the impact of economic issues on 
teachers’ relations with the children they wanted to get back to. The surface issues—
hiring practices, compensation for longer workdays, the distribution of resources 
along lines of “merit,” and the very definition of merit as success on standardized 
tests—represent the tip of an iceberg of unease about the changing terms of work. 
dEmocracy and thE ProblEm of knowlEdgE
A century ago, the changing terms of work sparked similar debate about the viability 
of democratic governance. As industrial capitalism replaced agriculture, it seemed 
to observers like Walter Lippmann that Jeffersonian democracy had ceased to be 
(if it ever was) a useful vision.10 In Public Opinion, Lippmann argues that modern 
political theory has overlooked an essential question, that of “how knowledge of 
the world can be brought to the ruler”: 
In deciding who was most fit to govern, knowledge of the world was taken 
for granted. The aristocrat believed that those who dealt with large affairs 
possessed the instinct, the democrats asserted that all men possessed the 
instinct and could therefore deal with large affairs. If you were for the 
people you did not try to work out the question of how to keep the voter 
informed. By the age of twenty-one he had his political faculties. What 
counted was a good heart, a reasoning mind, a balanced judgment. These 
would ripen with age, but it was not necessary to consider how to inform 
the heart and feed the reason. Men took in their facts as they took in their 
breath. (Public Opinion, 140) 
What men took in, however, were stereotypes and propaganda, Lippmann 
argues, and this would be well-nigh impossible to correct. Modern societies, with 
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their vast scale and technological complexity, cannot be governed by an educated 
citizenry, he contends, because policy questions are too complex for any individual 
citizen to understand sufficiently. The gap between “a good heart and a reasoning 
mind” and “good judgment” had by the industrial era become too vast for any citi-
zen to overcome. In The Phantom Public, Lippmann raises the related problem of 
voter apathy, which he sees as a logical effect of the overwhelming complexity of 
information voters are asked to digest. Lippmann concludes that to bring knowl-
edge to bear on public problems, politicians ought to be guided not by the whims 
of their constituents but by scientific experts. 
Dewey responded to Lippmann in favorable reviews of both books in the 
New Republic and then more extensively in The Public and Its Problems. Lippmann 
provided an accurate diagnosis of the problem, Dewey thought, but not a good pre-
scription. Lippmann shows to be an illusion the “‘omnicompetent’ individual: com-
petent to frame policies, to judge their results; competent to know in all situations 
demanding political action what is for his own good, and competent to enforce his 
own idea of good.”11 Insofar as older theories of democracy were founded on that 
illusion, on the notion “that each individual is of himself equipped with the intel-
ligence needed, under the operation of self-interest, to engage in political affairs,” 
those theories are proven inadequate.12 But Lippmann is mistaken, Dewey argues, 
about how knowledge properly informs public affairs. “Personally,” he writes, “I 
am far from thinking that such considerations [as laid out by Lippmann], pertinent 
as they are to administrative activities, cover the entire political field.”13 The Public 
and Its Problems addresses those considerations with an alternative account of the 
political field and its relation to knowledge.
Knowledge, Dewey argues, is social, not individual. It is “a function of asso-
ciation and communication; it depends upon tradition, upon tools and methods 
socially transmitted, developed and sanctioned. Faculties of effectual observation, 
reflection and desire are habits acquired under the influence of the culture and in-
stitutions of society, not ready-made inherent powers.”14 Where both Lippmann 
and the older democratic theory he critiques are mistaken, Dewey suggests, is in 
their shared assumptions that the knowledge citizens need is (a) an individual pos-
session and (b) all of one sort. Rather, Dewey argues, the knowledge a democracy 
needs is a social possession, which arises through inquiry and communication 
around problems perceived to be relevant to the collective. Furthermore, as regards 
the knowledge that ought to inform public policy, technical expertise needs to be 
connected with practical reason.
Because Dewey’s answer is, as usual, quite complex, both pieces of this two-
pronged answer to Lippmann’s case for technocracy call for exegesis. First, the as-
sumption that for democracy to function individual citizens would need knowledge 
that they cannot possess is mistaken because it rests on a misconception regarding 
the relation between “individual” and “society.” Because liberal political theory has 
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conceptualized an individual who can be disassociated from all the social groups 
to which he might belong (e.g., church, guild, state), “there grows up in the mind 
an image of a residual individual who is not a member of any association at all.” 
But even an entity such as a tree is not straightforwardly “an individual,” Dewey 
argues, because it is made up of smaller entities, such as cells, and is part of a larger 
entity, such as its ecosystem. To call the tree an “individual” is to focus attention 
on one level of organization rather than others. For human beings, whose interac-
tions with their environment are far more complex than those of trees, this is even 
more true. The misconception of human beings as unified entities then creates the 
“unreal problem” of how and why such individuals might choose to become asso-
ciated. Once we replace this notion with that of individuals as always associated, 
the problem becomes that of “adjusting groups and individuals to each other.” For 
this, knowledge is necessary, but the knowledge possessed within the group can 
be understood as a possession shared by the individuals who constitute the group. 
Second, Dewey charges, Lippmann’s conclusion that politicians ought to be 
guided not by voters but by scientific experts is mistaken because technical exper-
tise is not the only knowledge relevant to political decision-making: 
There is a sense in which ‘opinion’ rather than knowledge, even under the 
most favorable circumstances, is the proper term to use—namely in the 
sense of judgment, estimate. For in its strict sense, knowledge can refer only 
to what has happened and been done. What is still to be done involves a 
forecast of a future still contingent, and cannot escape the liability to error 
in judgment involved in all anticipation of probabilities. There may well 
be honest divergence as to policies to be pursued, even when plans spring 
from knowledge of the same facts.15
In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey paraphrases the account of practical 
reason that he developed more thoroughly in earlier books, especially Human Na-
ture and Conduct. His account, akin to ideas of “practice” developed by Wittgenstein 
and MacIntyre, is an Aristotelian phronesis for everyday usage juxtaposed with 
Platonic techne. Neither technical knowledge nor judgment alone will adequately 
serve the public in its efforts to resolve the problems it faces, Dewey claims, but 
both must be brought to bear. After pointing out the importance of judgment in a 
world of possibilities, the paragraph above continues, “But genuinely public policy 
cannot be generated unless it be informed by knowledge, and this knowledge does 
not exist except when there is systematic, thorough, and well-equipped search and 
record.”16 Technical expertise, in other words, is necessary; the mistake would be 
to assume that it is sufficient. 
Judgment and scientific knowledge are fundamentally related, in Dewey’s ac-
count, inasmuch as both are rooted in habit. “Thinking,” he writes, “is secreted in 
the interstices of habits.” Illustrating his account with workers whose jobs Plato and 
the framers of the Constitution would have recognized, he notes that “The sailor, 
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miner, fisherman and farmer think, but their thoughts fall within the framework of 
accustomed occupations and relationships.”17 What makes the thinking of scientists 
different is that they “are persons of a specialized, infrequent habit.”18 The knowledge 
they accumulate is different from the judgments of a farmer because it is a more sys-
tematic, thorough, and well-equipped record of what has happened. To say this is not 
to attribute to scientific experts any expertise in judgment. In fact, Dewey argues, 
to the extent that science is isolated from everyday affairs, it is irrelevant to public 
policy. It need not be so, but if scientific knowledge is to have relevance to political 
decision-making, it needs to be in communication with the practical judgments made 
by all who are to be affected, which is to say made not by technical experts but by the 
democratic public. In Dewey’s words, “The man who wears the shoe knows best that 
it pinches and where it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker is the best judge of how 
the trouble is to be remedied.”19 The industrial age has radically altered how shoes are 
produced, to the point that most people can no longer make and fix their own shoes, 
but it has not altered the value of the shoe-wearer’s judgment. 
When the application of science is “rather to human concerns than in them . . . 
external, made in the interests of its consequences for a possessing and acquisitive 
class,” Dewey argues, the effects are disastrous. Knowledge divided from judgment 
has played its part in generating enslavement of men, women and children 
in factories in which they are animated machines to tend inanimate ma-
chines. It has maintained sordid slums, flurried and discontented careers, 
grinding poverty and luxurious wealth, brutal exploitations of man and 
nature in times of peace and high explosives and noxious gases in times 
of war.20 
As compared to this list, the effects of contemporary educational reform seem 
relatively mild, but the point holds. Decision-making cannot be done well when 
it becomes the province of technocrats. This is not to say that education research 
has no bearing on the problems facing contemporary schooling. Rather, when it 
comes to decision-making, Dewey’s argument suggests, the sophisticated knowl-
edge accumulated by experts is useful only insofar as it is in communication with 
the judgments of those who, because they wear the shoes, can reason about ends. 
nEw ProblEmS
Jumping forward to present times, Dewey’s account of shoe-repair can seem posi-
tively quaint. After all, who has shoes fixed anymore? The wealthy may take their 
handcrafted Manolos to the cobbler, but since the globalization of industrial pro-
duction has further brought down the price of new shoes, most people simply 
throw worn pairs out. To put it differently, now that the terms of work have changed 
again, do the characteristics of the post-industrial age render Dewey’s defense of 
democracy passé? 
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In The Culture of the New Capitalism, Richard Sennett raises this concern. 
Sennett argues that changes in the post-industrial workplace have led to new cul-
tural ideals that work against democratic politics. Although he mentions neither 
Lippmann nor Dewey, Sennett reconsiders the issues both addressed: the effects 
of technological advances on culture, the relevance of how labor is structured to 
how people think, and what this means for democracy. Sennett’s analysis has three 
parts. First, he explains how “cutting edge” workplaces have changed people’s under-
standing of work experience. In the past, Sennett explains, organizations adopted 
a pyramidal structure, in which a worker’s gradually increasing skill was rewarded 
by advances up the pyramid, generally at a predictable pace. Authority at the top 
issued directives, which were interpreted by subauthorities as the directives were 
passed down to the workers at the bottom. Traditional teaching pay scales, which 
reward years of service and credit-hours of professional development, exemplify 
this interpretation of how skill develops through time and ought to be recognized, 
as does the traditional structure of school authority in which directives pass from 
board of education to teachers through several layers of interpreting administrators. 
In contrast, Sennett proposes, the contemporary organization is structured like an 
MP3 player, with an organizing force at the center able directly to access (without 
the mediating machinery of bureaucratic hierarchy) a vast array of possible work-
ers. Although this structure promises worker autonomy, Sennett contends that it 
disempowers workers. It renders the organization inscrutable and unpredictable, 
and it diminishes both the relationships and the necessity of mediating interpreta-
tion that enabled the middle and bottom rungs of the hierarchy to shape the terms 
of their work. Furthermore, it changes the meaning of experience, as accumulated 
time on the job is devalued. 
This newly possible structure depends upon a notion of skill as inherent merit 
rather than slow-growing experience. The prevailing model, Sennett proposes in 
his second essay, is meritocracy rather than craftsmanship. Although his terms 
are different from Lippmann’s and Dewey’s, from Plato’s and Aristotle’s, it restates 
the contrast between technical and practical expertise, techne and phronesis. In his 
discussion of merit, Sennett considers the SAT and the conception of innate talent 
it implies; while his example centers on student learning, the contrast he draws 
between merit as potential and craftsmanship as experience applies equally to 
how contemporary schooling treats teachers’ development of professional skill. In 
public schooling, programs that put bright, inexperienced young people in class-
rooms and replace them within a few years by new waves of the same embody the 
merit conception. At the level of school buildings, so does the logic of turnarounds 
and school closings: a school that does not meet expectations is treated as intrinsi-
cally flawed, better closed and replaced with a new model than carefully mended. 
Like Dewey, Sennett is aware that conceptions of expert knowledge are cul-
tural effects of how work is structured that carry significant implications for politics. 
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While his sympathy for practice aligns him with Dewey, his attunement to con-
sumer culture makes him also an heir to Lippmann’s doubts. Industrialization, 
Sennett recognizes, made it possible for most people to approach their economic 
and political surroundings with a consumer’s mindset. “[B]y the mid-nineteenth 
century,” Sennett notes, it was “possible for a family of modest means to contem-
plate throwing out worn shoes rather than mending them.”21 Advances in tech-
nology and communications since then have intensified this shift from a craft to 
a consumer mindset. By the early twenty-first century, it is possible for a family of 
modest means to throw functional shoes out simply because they have gone out of 
style. No attention to how a thing works need be paid. Sennett worries that when 
citizens think as consumers rather than craftsmen, they “can disengage when po-
litical issues become difficult or resistant.”22 If a problem seems intractable, citizens 
can “throw it away” by shifting their attention elsewhere. Additionally, politicians 
and political parties come to seem interchangeable and disposable, which further 
disinclines citizens to hold them accountable: 
Democracy requires that citizens be willing to make some effort to find 
out how the world around them works. Few of the American proponents 
of the recent war on Iraq, for instance, wanted to learn about Iraq. Equally 
striking on the other side of the political spectrum, few proponents of stem-
cell research have been curious about the arguments put forth by Catholic 
theologians against this research. The citizen-as-craftsman would make 
the effort in either case to find out; when democracy becomes modeled on 
consumption . . . that will to know fades.23
With this analysis of how post-industrial consumer culture has reduced 
citizens’ appreciation of how things work, an appreciation that is necessary for en-
gagement with technical expertise to seem worth one’s while, Dewey’s response to 
Lippmann seems to lose its force. If the wearer of the shoe cannot be bothered to 
fix it, is there any hope left for the democratic public?
thE Public of ParEntS
Lippmann, Dewey and Sennett ground their inquiries into how conceptions of ex-
pert knowledge affect democratic politics in the changing terms of work. Yet their 
analyses ignore an important kind of work that has changed relatively little: raising 
children. In the language of feminist theory, they forget to account for reproductive 
labor. The experience of raising children has, of course, been affected by cultural 
and technological changes throughout the industrial and post-industrial eras, but 
elemental aspects are firmly fixed. Children still need to be fed, kept clean, provided 
appropriate shelter, cared for when ill, and educated. They present a ceaseless array 
of problems that their caretakers need to solve. If they do not function as anticipated 
or otherwise cease to satisfy, children cannot be easily replaced. If anything, children 
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are more irreplaceable than ever, due to medical advances that have made it possible 
for parents to expect all their children to reach adulthood.24 And, as observers of 
contemporary family life have documented, contemporary American parents are 
intensely involved in raising their children.25 As Sharon Hays argues in The Cultural 
Contradictions of Motherhood, how parents think about the care of their children has 
not followed the same trajectory as other aspects of culture in consumer capitalism.26 
Raising a child remains a practical undertaking, which requires both mastery 
of the means and judgment about the ends.27 Yet parents, too, have been subject 
to the creeping claims of scientific expertise working hand-in-hand with the cen-
tralization of government authority. In The Claims of Parenting, Stefan Ramaekers 
and Judith Suissa argue that “the parent-child relationship . . . has been claimed by 
certain languages and forms of reasoning, to the extent that it has become difficult 
to find other ways of talking about it and exploring its significance, at both an indi-
vidual and a societal level.”28 As they document, the translation of developmental 
psychology and neuropsychology into parenting discourse scientizes child-raising 
and encourages parents to think of themselves as professionals, albeit inevitably 
flawed professionals in need of guidance by experts. The widespread understand-
ing “of childrearing as something parents can no longer do without some form of 
expertise,” they note, leads to “acceptance of the area of childrearing as a field for 
increasing government intervention.”29 Ramaekers and Suissa restrict their inquiry 
to the experience of parents, but much the same can be said about that of teachers, 
to whom parents entrust part of the work of child-raising. Like parents, teachers are 
expected to interpret their interactions with children in terms of a technical, uni-
versalized expertise and then, because their own expertise proves insufficient, sub-
ject their day-to-day engagement with children to centralized government control.
What the 2012 Chicago Teachers Strike suggests is that parents and teach-
ers, in spite of their adoption of technicist discourses, and in spite of a widespread 
consumerist orientation, have not lost their political agency, at least as regards the 
education of children. On the picket lines, I heard a distinct shift from the language 
of psychology to that of politics. Teachers who, in routine school-parent commu-
nications, had expressed their plans for children entirely in terms of emotional 
intelligence, learning styles, and other scientistic discourses, were suddenly talk-
ing about injustice. As for consumerism, it too was trumped by politics when the 
problems facing children were perceived as serious. Later that year, when Mayor 
Emanuel promised iPads and air conditioners as part of his plan to close 10% of 
Chicago’s elementary schools, parents were more furious than mollified, turning 
out to community meetings by the thousands to express their disapproval. The shoe 
was rubbing painfully, so teachers and parents spoke up. Members of the commu-
nity perceived a problem in how their children’s schools were being reconfigured; 
parents and teachers thought they ought to have some say in how this problem was 
resolved; and a public came, however briefly, into existence. 
E&C    EduCation and CulturE
30    amy b. ShuffElton
It will not do to overstate the case. When some fellow parents and I posted 
strike-related notes (e.g., librarian-recommended historical fiction about labor 
movements, the suggestion that parents eager to support the teachers bring dough-
nuts and coffee to the picket lines) on our children’s class email list, other parents 
objected on the grounds that we did not all support the strike and therefore should 
not talk about it in this communal venue. Confirming Sennett’s (and Lipmann’s) 
analysis, a note advertising free bowling was celebrated as the kind of news it was 
appropriate to share. And of course, some Chicago parents did side with the Board 
of Education. The teachers I talked to were bothered by the inequitable distribution 
of resources among Chicago’s segregated neighborhood schools, but mostly they 
wanted to get back to the classroom, and when the strike ended they expressed 
relief. When the strike ended, it left little concrete mark beyond the negotiated 
contract. Parents’ and teachers’ political engagement during the strike, in sum, 
does not disconfirm the concerns about depoliticization expressed by Lippmann, 
Sennett, and Suissa and Ramaekers. Yet it serves as a reminder that a democratic 
public, however fleeting, is still possible. Dewey never promises that a democratic 
public will come into existence, let alone permanent existence, even if conditions 
are right, only that it can. In this, the responses of parents and teachers to condi-
tions in Chicago Public Schools during the 2012–13 school year suggest he is cor-
rect. Post-industrial society presents new challenges, but a public can still emerge.
Dewey correctly includes those who experience the effects of a problem 
alongside those who have the expertise to suggest fixes as necessary participants 
in a workable solution. Technocracy is not and cannot be democracy. As I have 
suggested in this paper, ongoing changes in how work is organized, tied to on-
going changes in what knowledge is recognized—which stood as the backdrop 
to Dewey’s argument with Lippmann and have intensified since—give force to 
new challenges to Dewey’s argument. I have used the example of parents’ and 
teachers’ exercise of their political agency during the Chicago Teachers Strike to 
support my case that Dewey’s answer remains valid. However, his theory and its 
contemporary application raise a further set of unanswered questions. Who is to 
be included among those who experience the effects? (In a global era, what about 
problems more distant than a city school system?) And what if those affected fail 
to perceive the relevance of the problem to them? (In other words, what about 
those parents who preferred to restrict talk to announcements about free bowl-
ing?) These are questions I cannot hope to answer, only to set out as worthy of the 
communication and conversation that The Public and Its Problems calls for as the 
necessary basis of a democratic public. 
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